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ABSTRACT 
 
Sometimes wide disparities in workers’ earnings are defended as simply the meritocratic outcome of a 
competitive process. While inequalities due to discrimination or luck are admitted as temporary 
possibilities, it is frequently argued that competition and the profit motive will eliminate them in the 
longer term. In the present paper, this position is challenged. A model is developed to demonstrate that 
hiring errors can have persistent effects on individual workers’ earnings under conditions of capitalist 
competition. Hiring errors give the beneficiaries opportunities to learn and improve in their new jobs, 
raising the possibility that their initial advantages can become locked in. The model shows how 
fundamental features of the capitalist system (competition, the profit motive, the free labour exchange) 
can reinforce, and not always eliminate, these early advantages. While the emphasis is on random error, 
the same factors will play a comparable role in perpetuating the effects of discriminatory hiring decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Inequalities that arise within capitalist societies as a result of 
differences in workers’ employment outcomes are sometimes defended 
on the grounds that they merely reflect ‘merit’1 and individual free 
choice. This argument has been advanced in the past by some 
philosophers (e.g. Bauer, 1981; Letwin, 1983) and has even appeared 
in the occasional economics textbook (e.g. Phelps, 1967), but perhaps 
is most frequently heard at the popular level.2 The notion that there is a 
meritocratic foundation to workers’ earnings may also partially 
motivate existing opposition to affirmative-action schemes and various 
policies designed to redistribute income. The implicit inference 
appears to be that earned income must broadly reflect merit, because 
competitive pressures would surely eliminate discrimination and 
punish prejudiced decision-making. From this perspective, any policy 
that modified the distribution determined within the marketplace would 
appear to weaken the meritocratic outcome generated by the system. 
                                                 
1The term ‘merit’ undoubtedly has diverse meanings for different people. The precise 
meaning attributed to the term for the purposes of the present analysis shall be 
articulated later, in presenting the formal model. In broad terms, though, the term 
shall be taken to refer to a worker’s productive capability, including his or her 
potential for improvement in this capability through learning. 
2 Phelps instructs his student readers that “In relating wages to workers’ productivity 
as measured by market demand, it satisfies ethical as well as logical requirements. 
Men are paid what they are worth, rather than according to their social positions (just 
price), job characteristics (Smith), subsistence requirements (Ricardo), the available 
working capital (wages fund), what is left over (residual claimant), need (Marx), or 
bargaining power (Webbs)” (Phelps, 1967, p. 497, emphasis in original). In this 
passage, Phelps is actually referring to the marginal-productivity theory of wages, 
which he regards as the theory of wage determination most closely fitting reality. 
This quote, taken from a past labour economics textbook, is admittedly hand-picked 
and perhaps unrepresentative, but it makes explicit a perception that is probably 
shared by some sections of the wider community. 
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Quite apart from deeper issues concerning the virtues of 
meritocracy is the more immediate question of whether capitalist social 
relations actually do ensure, or at least encourage, meritocratic 
outcomes. Much work has been done to document the apparent 
pervasiveness of employment discrimination (a recent review is 
provided by Mason, 1999), some economists arguing that 
discrimination is not only consistent with, but instrumental to, profit 
maximisation and the motive drive of capital (e.g. Darity, 1989; Darity 
and Williams, 1985; Mason, 1993, 1995; Shulman, 1984; Williams, 
1987, 1991). Yet, even if capitalism could be relied upon to eliminate 
all discrimination, this would be insufficient to ensure that wages 
always truly reflected a worker’s merit and free choices, simply 
because there will always be an element of chance in any individual’s 
employment outcomes.3 
When it comes to a person’s employment success, luck can of 
course exert an influence at many levels, and at many points in life, not 
least in the lottery of birth. In the present paper, attention is confined to 
the consequences of luck at the point of hiring. Informational 
asymmetries make it inevitable that employers will occasionally err 
                                                 
3 It is important here to distinguish between tendencies operating at the group rather 
than individual level. In a hypothetical world without prejudice and discrimination, 
capitalist social processes might well be expected to result in strong correlations 
between the earned incomes and merits of broad categories of workers, taken on the 
average and controlling for the element of individual choice. Or, more realistically, 
within a segmented workforce in which members of each segment have differential 
access to employment opportunities, such a drive towards meritocracy on the average 
might be expected to operate within each segment. But for an individual worker 
whose employment success failed to reflect merit and personal preference, the 
existence of a tendency working at a more aggregate level would be of little solace. 
In a sense, in what follows, it shall be argued that some of the key features of the 
capitalist system (e.g. competition, the profit motive) that might be expected to 
generate a tendency towards meritocracy on the average, at least within workforce 
segments, can be the very factors that prevent meritocratic outcomes from being 
realised in individual instances. 
when choosing among job applicants. If it were possible for 
unprejudiced, profit-maximising employers to have their time over, 
they would make different recruitment decisions in these instances. 
Once a selection has been made, however, and a degree of worker 
learning has occurred on the job, an employer’s decision over whether 
to reverse any hiring error becomes more involved. This will be so 
even if hiring and firing are assumed to be costless and instantaneous 
in execution. 
For a ‘merit-based’ defence of inequality to be convincing, it 
would need to be demonstrated that such random events have no 
significant, long-lasting effects on individual workers’ earnings; or, at 
least, that under capitalism, there is a tendency for underlying systemic 
forces to exert pressure in this direction. The question becomes: can 
the effects of good and bad luck reasonably be expected to ‘cancel out’ 
for an individual over his or her lifetime? 
Coram (1998) notes a general neglect of the longer term 
influences of luck by researchers in the social sciences and attributes 
the oversight to a widespread belief, stemming perhaps from a 
misinterpretation of the ‘law of large numbers’, that the effects of 
chance events do indeed tend to ‘cancel out’ over time.4 In the present 
paper it is contended that, to the contrary, in the case of hiring errors, 
key features of the social system can be expected to work precisely 
against such a ‘cancelling out’ of the effects of luck. 
The argument is developed with the aid of a simple model. 
Within the model, workers who are incorrectly hired ahead of more 
capable applicants gain an opportunity to learn and improve on the job. 
With a sufficient headstart they may overtake superior applicants in 
terms of cost efficiency measured at a given moment. While superior 
workers have the potential, if hired, ultimately to achieve greater cost 
                                                 
4 This charge is possibly less applicable to economists than other social scientists, 
given, for instance, the interest of a significant number of economists in the 
consequences of the irreversibility of many socio-economic and historical processes 
(e.g. the substantial literature on path dependence). 
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efficiency than incumbents, there would be an interim period during 
which their performance would actually be inferior. In such a scenario, 
the so-called ‘free labour exchange’, by allowing either the worker or 
employer to end the arrangement at any moment, creates uncertainty 
for the employer over how long a replacement is likely to remain with 
the firm once hired. In cases where correcting a past error would 
require the employer to endure an initial period of higher costs, 
employers cannot be sure that replacements will stay long enough for 
their potential to bear fruit in the form of lower costs. Accordingly, the 
profit motive will sometimes dictate that employers stick with 
incumbents, even if unmeritocratic decisions have clearly been made. 
In this way, hiring errors, even if recognised, will not always be 
corrected, primarily because of two inherent features of the capitalist 
system: the free labour exchange and the profit motive. The former 
makes any potential gains of a replacement worker necessarily 
uncertain and contingent; the latter compels the employer to make 
decisions solely on the basis of expected costs, rather than any other 
criterion, such as ‘merit’ or ‘fairness’. In some instances, the decision 
that is expected to maximise profit may coincide with the meritocratic 
outcome. But this will not always be the case. The main purpose of the 
present paper is to clarify some of the factors that will influence the 
outcome in any individual case, and in doing so, to demonstrate the 
unlikelihood of capitalist competition promoting the reversal of past 
hiring errors in many instances. 
 
2. Job Competition 
 
The very notion of a merit-based distribution of earned income 
presupposes that requisite mechanisms or institutions are in place to 
ensure that individuals are given the opportunity to exercise, and be 
rewarded for, relevant personal qualities such as innate abilities, skills, 
intelligence, knowledge, experience, self-discipline, initiative, 
obedience or effort. Casual reflection suggests that, in the main, jobs 
are not tailored to the personal qualities of workers, but rather, from 
the perspective of the worker, are already in existence, shaped by a 
variety of social and technical factors that operate beyond the merely 
individual realm. If the distribution of earned income is to reflect 
merit, it must be through some channel other than the way in which 
jobs are designed. Specifically, workers, in competing for more or less 
predefined jobs, would need to be ranked in such a way that the most 
meritorious among them were assured of winning the ‘best’ positions. 
It is through this indirect means that workers’ personal qualities might 
be expected to exert an influence on rankings within the income scale. 
This distinction is emphasised by Thurow (1972, 1975) in his 
theory of job competition. In Thurow’s theory, the determination of the 
distribution of wage income can be viewed in two basic steps. One set 
of factors shapes the types of jobs that are created, the proportions in 
which these various forms of employment are offered and the nature of 
the varying job hierarchies that are developed within firms. Another set 
of factors, logically separable from the first, though not entirely 
independent of the distribution of job opportunities, influences 
workers’ rankings within the consequent job queues and hence their 
relative success in the competition for available positions. 
More specifically, within Thurow’s theoretical setting, workers 
are depicted as competing for employment opportunities that have 
been shaped by three main factors: society’s technical knowledge, the 
nature of training costs across jobs, and sociological determinants of 
wages. Given the wide variety of explanations that could be advanced 
in relation to these three factors, it is evident that Thurow’s framework 
is sufficiently open to accommodate more than one theory of job 
formation. Of particular note, room is left for competing theories of 
wage determination. In Thurow’s framework, “wages are paid based 
on the characteristics of the job” (Thurow and Lucas, 1972, p. 2), not 
the worker. Although this perspective allows for the possibility that 
wages may reflect marginal productivity or some other measure of 
productive contribution (with the characteristics of the job determining 
the worker’s productiveness), alternative theories emphasising 
sociological, cultural or historical determinants of the distribution of 
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wage income can just as easily be situated within the theoretical 
framework, and indeed a sociological determination unrelated to 
productive contribution shall be assumed in the present analysis.5 
Similarly, the job-competition framework is open to the 
possibility that capitalist employers design jobs with issues of 
hierarchy and control in mind. For example, jobs that are of greater 
strategic importance to capitalist employers – typically technical, 
scientific or managerial positions – will tend to entail higher 
remuneration and better working conditions (Mason, 1993, pp. 14-16). 
Such considerations of hierarchy and control are also likely to 
influence the development of society’s technical knowledge, another of 
Thurow’s factors affecting the distribution of job opportunities, since it 
is capitalists who ultimately decide which technologies are adopted out 
of the various possibilities developed by inventive individuals and 
organisations. Inventors, in turn, cannot afford to be oblivious to the 
likely preferences of capitalists. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, the most important 
aspect of the job-competition framework is the observation that, as a 
result of an ongoing social process, workers are confronted at any point 
in time with an existing distribution of job opportunities; opportunities 
that, in a sense, appear predefined, arising independently of workers’ 
own personal qualities and interests. Most workers must compete for 
                                                 
5 Thurow himself does posit a connection of sorts between marginal productivity and 
wages, although the usual direction of causation is reversed. In his approach, 
marginal productivities are inherent in jobs while wages are sociologically 
determined. Firms then hire workers up to the point at which “marginal productivity 
is driven down to the level given by the exogenous wage” (Thurow, 1975, p. 109). 
But while this is one conceivable approach, others are permissible within the job-
competition model. For instance, Mason (1999) integrates Marx’s theory of wages 
into the framework, in which wages are governed by the culturally determined cost of 
reproducing labour power and bear no direct relationship to productive contribution. 
Many other approaches apart from Marx’s depict wages as unrelated to productive 
contribution, including the theories of Smith and Ricardo, as well as more recent 
work developed in Marxist, Sraffian, Post Keynesian and institutionalist traditions. 
such predefined positions and, if successful, submit to whatever 
training is required to fulfil the role. Employers, in making hiring 
decisions, must rely on workers’ imperfectly observable background 
characteristics to select those who are capable of attaining the desired 
level of productivity – or, less stringently, a level of productivity 
regarded by the employer as acceptable – with the least investment in 
training. 
Since workers are trained to the level required by the position, 
and productivity is primarily determined by the job, not the worker, the 
development of workers’ productive capabilities is closely tied to their 
current jobs and personal employment histories. An implication that 
immediately follows is that hiring errors will alter the training 
opportunities and learning paths that are open to both the beneficiaries 
and the victims. The beneficiaries of hiring errors, by obtaining better 
jobs than the victims, will enter more favourable job ladders with 
greater opportunities for learning and stronger prospects for 
advancement. Intuitively, it seems conceivable that the effects on 
individual earnings will sometimes prove decisive.6 Such effects could 
be negated, however, if the competitive necessities of capitalism 
dictated the prompt reversal of any such errors, at least in those 
instances where they were discovered. It is this possibility that requires 
closer scrutiny. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Thurow appears to allude to this possibility when he writes: “Individuals could be 
ranked in terms of their potential economic ability by looking at the job for which 
they exhibit the highest benefit cost ratio. The costs would be the training costs for 
that job and the benefits would be the discounted lifetime earnings for the same job. 
The individual might not, however, be able to realize his potential if he is unable to 
win the competition for his best jobs. His actual economic ability will be given by the 
benefit cost ratio of the best job that he is actually able to get” (Thurow, 1975, p.243, 
note 6). 
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3. A Simple Model 
 
To examine the issue more closely, a highly stylised scenario shall be 
considered in which workers compete for a specific job. Associated 
with the job is a given wage that is assumed to be sociologically 
determined in a manner not directly related to any measure of 
productive contribution, and a set of working conditions that have been 
shaped by the ongoing social processes that affect, in greater or lesser 
degree, the development of all currently existing employment 
opportunities. In a broad sense, the stylised scenario can be regarded as 
taking place within the job-competition setting, although one 
significant departure shall be made from Thurow’s specific version of 
the theory that will soon become evident. 
It may be helpful to summarise the basic scenario in broad terms 
before turning to formal modelling. The hypothetical situation can be 
described as follows: 
1. Employers know that there are two types of workers 
competing for the job. Type 1 workers are less capable than 
type 2 workers, making them more costly to train to an 
acceptable level of performance. 
2. Worker performance on the job is measured by unit labour 
cost. A type 2 worker is ultimately capable of achieving a 
lower unit labour cost than a type 1 worker.7 
                                                 
7 This is the main departure from Thurow’s formulation. In his theory, workers 
compete on the basis of training costs. Superior workers incur lower training costs for 
the employer in attaining a target level of productivity. In contrast, in the present 
model, workers are assessed in terms of unit labour costs. Since it is assumed that 
superior workers can achieve lower unit labour costs than inferior workers, it follows 
that they can reach higher levels of productivity. In the present context, there is no 
contradiction in workers of varying capabilities competing for the same job (with the 
same wage) and ultimately attaining different levels of productivity, because of the 
assumption that wages are sociologically determined and unrelated to productive 
contribution. Despite this departure from Thurow’s formulation, an affinity with the 
3. Employers cannot observe and accurately interpret all 
relevant worker characteristics at the point of hiring, making 
error possible. 
4. Once a hiring decision has been made, the employer can try 
to evaluate whether a worker is performing to expectation. 
However, the worker’s actual performance is not perfectly 
observable and must be discerned over time. Any gap 
between the perceived and actual performance of a worker 
will only be eliminated once the employer has verified 
whether the worker is type 2, as initially believed, or type 1, 
which would indicate that a hiring error has been made. The 
time it takes to recognise any error – the recognition lag – 
will vary depending on the precise nature of the job. 
5. If it is recognised that an error has been made, the employer 
must decide whether to replace the incumbent. There are no 
restrictions on firing and the decision is based purely on 
cost. 
6. In making any replacement, the employer once again 
possesses incomplete information at the point of hiring, 
making further error possible. 
3.1. Worker Cost Efficiency and Learning 
The productive capabilities and learning capacities of the two types of 
workers shall be represented by simple learning curves, which relate 
workers’ unit labour costs to amounts of experience on the job. Given 
the wage and conditions of the job, workers’ unit labour costs will tend 
to fall, in varying degrees, as they learn with experience. Defining ui(t) 
as the unit labour cost of a type i worker, i = 1, 2, who has accumulated 
                                                                                                                    
job-competition theory remains in that, within the model, the degree of a worker’s 
superiority over another depends largely on the characteristics of the job, and not 
primarily on differences in workers’ personal traits. 
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an amount t of experience, the learning curve can be given the 
following specific functional form:8 
 iti i iu m c e
λ−= +  (1) 
ui(t) can be regarded as a worker’s instantaneous cost efficiency, as it 
measures the worker’s unit labour cost at a particular moment. 
The first component of the learning curve, mi, is the unit labour 
cost that the worker tends towards as experience is accumulated. The 
second component, itic e
λ , is the reducible portion of unit labour cost, 
intended to characterise the learning process. It equals ci when t = 0 
and approaches zero as t → ∞ . The specification of exponential 
learning ensures that as workers improve with experience, their unit 
labour costs fall but at a decreasing rate, where λi provides an 
approximate measure of learning speed. The term ci denotes the 
worker’s scope for learning. It indicates the extent to which the 
worker’s initial unit labour cost, mi + ci, exceeds its potential level, mi. 
To reflect the superiority of type 2 workers, it shall be assumed 
that they approach a lower unit labour cost over time (m2 < m1). The 
diagrams in Figure 1 provide three broad cases that can arise under this 
restriction. In case 1, type 2 workers have less scope for learning (c2 < 
c1) and a slower rate of learning (λ2 < λ1), whereas in cases 2 and 3 
they have greater scope for learning (c2 > c1) and a more rapid rate of 
learning (λ2 > λ1). In case 3, type 2 workers have a higher initial unit 
labour cost than type 1 workers (m2 + c2 > m1 + c1), causing the 
learning curves to cross. Since in the scenario under investigation type 
2 workers are assumed to be superior to type 1 workers, it is unclear 
                                                 
8 The characterisation of learning in the present model is similar to one used by 
Spence (1981) in a different context. A specific functional form for the learning 
curve has been adopted for expositional reasons. Some of the tendencies to be 
discussed, especially those relating to worker learning, can be brought out more 
clearly once a specific functional form for the learning curve is chosen. The complete 
model, cast in more general terms, is presented in the appendix. 
whether case 3 should be included. Unless the average duration of a 
worker’s employment in the job is quite long, a type 1 worker would 
actually cost less along the early portion of the learning curve than a 
type 2 worker. For this reason, one further restriction shall be placed 
on the parameters; namely, m2 + c2 < m1 + c1, ruling out the case where 
learning curves cross.9 Taken together, the restrictions m2 < m1 and m2 
+ c2 < m1 + c1 mean that a type 2 worker’s learning curve lies entirely 
below a type 1 worker’s learning curve. In other words, the unit labour 
cost of a type 2 worker is always smaller than that of a type 1 worker 
whenever experience levels are the same. It is in this specific sense that 
type 2 workers are taken to possess greater ‘merit’ than type 1 workers 
throughout the present analysis. 
 
3.2. Hiring Errors 
Errors occur when type 1 workers are incorrectly offered jobs ahead of 
type 2 workers. Once hired, the advantaged workers will have an 
opportunity to learn on the job and lower their unit labour costs with 
experience. Given sufficient headstarts, they may succeed in lowering 
their unit labour costs below the levels that type 2 workers would 
initially achieve if hired. In each of the diagrams in figure 1, a type 1 
worker with an amount of experience τ  has a lower unit labour cost 
than a type 2 worker with no experience. If, at time τ, the employer 
realises that a mistake has been made, the question of whether it would 
be profitable to replace the incumbent becomes relevant. With 
replacement there is the possibility that a further error will occur, 
which would be costly because the incumbent is more efficient than 
another type 1 worker with less experience, who has not had the same 
                                                 
9 This is not to deny that there are some conceivable situations where a superior 
worker could have a higher initial unit labour cost. However, the purpose of the 
present analysis is to show that hiring errors will not always be corrected. If this can 
be demonstrated in cases where the learning curves do not cross, it could certainly be 
established in cases where they do. For this reason, little is lost by excluding this 
variation of the basic scenario from the analysis. 
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opportunity to learn. On the other hand, the successful recruitment of a 
type 2 worker might prove cost minimising, but will depend on the 
precise characteristics of the workers’ learning curves, which, in turn, 
are largely determined by the nature of the job. 
 
3.3. The Replacement Decision 
In deciding whether to make the replacement, the key problem for the 
employer is not to find the precise moment at which a new worker 
would be expected to achieve a lower instantaneous unit labour cost, 
but rather the point at which a switch could enable lower expected 
costs for the entire period under consideration. The length of this 
period can be defined as the employer’s time horizon, h. Since there is 
uncertainty over how long workers will stay with a firm once hired (as 
a result of the free labour exchange), employers’ time horizons will 
inevitably be finite. The more rapid the rate of turnover associated with 
the job in question, the shorter the employer’s time horizon is likely to 
be. The total cost of continuing to employ the incumbent for this entire 
period is represented in each of the diagrams in figure 1 by the area 
beneath u1 between τ and τ + h. The corresponding costs for 
accidentally employing a new type 1 worker or successfully employing 
a new type 2 worker are represented by the areas beneath u1 and u2, 
respectively, between 0 and h. In general, employers may discount the 
value of future cost reductions when making recruitment decisions, 
somewhat modifying the costs implied by these areas. 
The switch will only be made if the total, discounted cost of 
continuing to employ the incumbent for the duration of the employer’s 
time horizon exceeds the expected, discounted cost of hiring a new 
worker. For the incumbent, this cost shall be denoted 1
IC . Similarly, 
the corresponding measures for new type 1 and 2 workers shall be 
denoted 1
NC  and 2
NC . Letting p represent the probability of further 
hiring error, the expected cost of a new worker is then 
1 2(1 )
N NpC p C+ − . Assuming risk neutrality for simplicity, 
replacement will only occur if: 
 1 1 2(1 )
I N NC pC p C> + −  (
Since type 2 workers have lower long-run cost efficiencies than 
type 1 workers, it is inevitable that the right-hand side of (2) would 
eventually fall below the left-hand side if enough time were allowed to 
elapse (i.e. if the employer’s time horizon were sufficiently long).10 If 
sufficient time did in fact elapse, the situation could never be reversed. 
This suggests that we can find the point in time (the minimum time 
horizon) for which the expected cost of hiring a new worker for the 
upcoming period just falls to the level associated with the incumbent: 
 ( )1 1 2(1 ) 0I N NZ C pC p C= − + − =  (
Here, Z is the expected gap between the total period costs of the 
incumbent and a new worker. If Z > 0, replacement is profitable, 
otherwise it is not. Setting Z = 0 indicates the minimum time horizon 
for which the switch could occur, given the shapes and positions of the 
two types of learning curves. 
The total, discounted cost of retaining a type 1 incumbent for the 
duration of the employer’s time horizon is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11 11 1 1
1
1 1i
h
r r htI rt r rhm cC m c e e dt e e e e
r r
τ
λ τ λλ τ
τ λ
+
− + − +− − − −= + = − + −+∫
 
                                                 
10 This is because the unit labour cost that a new worker would be expected to 
approach is a weighted average of m1 and m2, where m2 < m1, and so is smaller than 
the unit labour cost approached by the incumbent; i.e. pm1 + (1 – p) m2 < m1 since, by 
assumption, m2 < m1. 
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The corresponding costs for replacing the incumbent with a type 1 or 2 
worker are: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )11 1 11 1 1
10
1 1
h
r htN rt rhm cC m c e e dt e e
r r
λλ
λ
− +− − −= + = − + −+∫  
( ) ( ) ( )( )22 2 22 2 2
20
1 1
h
r htN rt rhm cC m c e e dt e e
r r
λλ
λ
− +− − −= + = − + −+∫  
Substituting these expressions into (3) and rearranging gives: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 1 1
1 1 1 0
rh r rh
r h r r h
m me e p e p
r r
c ce e p e p
r r
τ
λ λ τ λ
λ λ
− − −
− + − + − +
− − − − −
+ − − − − − =+ +
 (4) 
Since the learning curves are continuous and twice differentiable, the 
implicit function theorem can be invoked to express the time horizon 
as a function of the various parameters: 
 ( ), , , ,i i ih f m c pλ τ=  (5) 
 
3.3.1. Necessary Condition 
Correction of the hiring error could not possibly occur unless, as the 
time horizon is extended, the expected total cost of a new worker falls 
relative to that of the incumbent (i.e. unless Z grows as h is 
lengthened). This implies that a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for replacement is 0F h∂ ∂ > . Differentiating (4) with 
respect to h and rearranging gives: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 2
1
( ) ( ) 1 ( )
h h hrh r
rh r
F e m c e e p m c e p m c e
h
e u h e pu h p u h
λ τ λ λτ
ττ
− + − −− −
− −
∂  = + − + + − + ∂
 = + − + − 
 
This reveals that for 0F h∂ ∂ > , a new worker must be expected to 
have a lower instantaneous unit labour cost than the incumbent (in 
discounted terms) by the end of the employer’s time horizon: 
 ( )1 1 2( ) ( ) 1 ( )ru h e pu h p u hττ −+ > + −  (
By setting 0F h∂ ∂ > , rearranging, and taking the natural 
logarithm of both sides, the maximum discount rate, r , consistent with 
correction of the hiring error can be determined: 
 ( )11 2
( )1 ln
( ) 1 ( )
u hr r
pu h p u h
τ
τ
 += <   + − 
 (
 
3.3.2. Variations in the Parameters 
If F h∂ ∂  is restricted to positive values, the likelihood of replacement 
will depend upon the various parameters. Some of these effects are 
self-evident and can be dealt with in a cursory manner. The main 
exception is the role of learning, which requires closer attention and is 
left until the next section. 
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To dispense with the simplest effects first, it can be noted that the 
longer the recognition lag, τ , the greater the probability of hiring error, 
p, the larger a type 2 worker’s long-run cost efficiency, m2, and the 
more substantial such a worker’s scope for learning, c2, the longer the 
employer’s time horizon would need to be for correction of the hiring 
error to be profitable. These effects are confirmed by the positive signs 
of fτ , pf , 2mf  and 2cf .
11 Briefly, the effect of a lengthy recognition 
lag is to give incumbents greater opportunity to lock in their initial 
advantages; a greater probability of hiring error raises the expected 
cost of employing a new worker; a substantial scope for learning 
makes a worker’s unit labour cost upon first appointment high 
compared to its potential level, incurring high costs for the employer 
initially; while if a type 2 worker’s potential unit labour cost is 
relatively high, the prospective longer-term gains for the employer of 
recruiting a replacement will be limited in any case. 
The role of the type 1 learning curve is not quite so 
straightforward. The reason for this is that its shape affects not only the 
attractiveness of retaining the incumbent, but also the expected cost of 
a new worker, and hence, indirectly, the appeal of trying to identify a 
type 2 replacement. On the one hand, large disparities in the 
capabilities of the different types of workers encourage the removal of 
the incumbent. On the other hand, they increase the cost of 
inadvertently hiring another inferior worker. A widening of the gap 
between the learning curves of type 1 and 2 workers always produces 
these two competing effects. For this reason, large values for m1 and c1 
will only make replacement of the incumbent more likely if the 
probability of further hiring error is not too high. Specifically, 1 0mf <  
provided rp e τ−< , and 1 0cf <  provided ( )1 rp e λ τ− +< . The restrictions 
placed on p reveal that increases in type 1 workers’ long-run cost 
                                                 
11 In the present context, the sign of the partial derivative indicates whether an 
increase in the parameter lengthens (positive sign) or shortens (negative sign) the 
time horizon required for profitable replacement. 
efficiencies, m1, or scope for learning, c1, will only enhance the 
likelihood of hiring errors being corrected if the employer’s discount 
rate, r, is not too high and the recognition lag, τ, is not too long. A low 
discount rate increases the allure of possible efficiency improvements 
that could only arise, if at all, in the future. A short recognition lag 
means that any errors can be spotted quickly, reducing the incumbent’s 
opportunity to learn on the job and lock in an advantage. The relevance 
of λ1 for 1cf  is similar: slow type 1 learning makes it harder for the 
incumbent to achieve significant cost reductions before the hiring error 
is detected. 
To summarise what has been established so far, the effects of 
hiring errors are more likely to persist within the model when the 
employer’s time horizon is short. Furthermore, for a given time 
horizon, the chance of persistence is greater if the advantaged and 
disadvantaged workers are close in terms of potential unit labour costs. 
By the same token, wide divergence of the two types of workers’ 
learning curves will only reduce the likelihood of persistence if the 
probability of hiring error is not too great. 
 
3.4. Different Job Types 
It is perhaps worth reiterating at this point that, within a job-
competition setting, the various components of workers’ unit labour 
costs are not simply a reflection of their personal attributes. Rather, the 
shapes and positions of workers’ learning curves are critically 
influenced by the types of jobs for which they are competing. Thus the 
observation that hiring errors are more likely to have long-lasting 
effects on individual earnings where workers’ potential cost 
differentials are small does not necessarily imply that the failure to 
reverse such errors is due to small differences in workers’ merit more 
broadly defined. The small potential cost differential may simply 
reflect the nature of the job. 
Typically, in jobs where the performance of workers could 
conceivably vary widely, perhaps because considerable scope exists 
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for independent thought, action or initiative, there might be ample 
opportunity for workers to differentiate themselves through 
performance, which would be reflected in the shapes and positions of 
their learning curves. In contrast, in jobs that provide little opportunity 
for workers to excel, perhaps because the pace of work is largely 
governed by either technology or the tempo of others’ work, the 
learning curves of different workers would be more or less similar, 
irrespective of their broader capabilities.12 
 
4. The Effects of Learning 
 
The potential for on-the-job learning to perpetuate the effects of hiring 
errors remains to be investigated. To gain some insight into the matter, 
it will be helpful to assume that a type 1 worker’s rate of learning is a 
constant proportion of a type 2 worker’s rate of learning. Setting λ1 = λ 
and λ2 = vλ, with v > 0, and substituting into (4) gives:   
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
1 2
1 2
1 1 1
1 1 1 0
rh r rh
r h r v r h
m me e p e p
r r
c ce e p e p
r v r
τ
λ λ τ λ
λ λ
− − −
− + − + − +
− − − − −
+ − − − − − =+ +
 ( 4′ ) 
                                                 
12 In distinguishing between jobs on the basis of the scope they provide for workers 
to differentiate themselves through performance, the question is not simply one of 
‘high skill’ versus ‘low skill’ jobs. Desirable conduct from the employer’s 
perspective may include conformity, acquiescence or passivity, on which workers 
can clearly differ (Edwards, 1976). For this reason it may be difficult to draw a sharp 
line of distinction between different types of employment. Nevertheless, the key 
point remains that some jobs will facilitate greater variation in worker performance 
than others without necessarily implying anything about the broader capabilities of 
the workers involved. 
As a first step it is easy to verify that an acceleration of the 
learning speed of type 2 workers relative to type 1 workers (an increase 
in the value of v) increases the likelihood of the hiring error being 
corrected: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )221 1 1
0
v r h
v
p c e v r h v r
f
F h
λλ λ λ− +− + + − += − <∂ ∂
13 
This confirms that replacement of the incumbent can remain profitable 
with shorter time horizons if type 2 workers have a relatively rapid rate 
of learning. 
Less obviously, the effects of learning depend on the magnitude 
of λ, the rate at which learning occurs. For a given learning-speed 
differential (or, equivalently, a given v), the effects of hiring errors on 
individual earnings are more likely to persist for some values of λ than 
others. Specifically, hiring errors are more likely to be corrected when 
the rate of learning associated with the job is either rapid or slow. It is 
intermediate rates of learning that make correction of hiring errors least 
likely.14 
These tendencies are most easily observed by resorting to direct 
calculation of Z for different values of λ, recalling that it is profitable 
to correct hiring errors if Z > 0, but not otherwise. Holding all other 
parameters constant, the sign of Z depends on the value of λ. The range 
of values of λ that can be classified as ‘intermediate’ depends on the 
values specified for the other parameters, but the same basic pattern 
always emerges. When learning is slow, the incumbent’s headstart is 
                                                 
13 The sign of vf  is clear if it is recognised that the expression ( ) ( )( )1 1v r he v r hλ λ− + + + −  in the numerator is of the form ( )1 1xe x− + − , which 
is always positive. This makes the entire expression for vf  negative. 
14 Spence (1981, p. 57) identifies an analogous effect in industries where costs are 
characterised by the learning curve. In his analysis, early entrants into an industry are 
more likely ultimately to dominate the market when learning occurs at moderate 
rates. 
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unlikely to be decisive. As the rate of learning is increased into the 
intermediate range, the profitability of replacing the incumbent falls, 
but then rises again when learning is rapid. These tendencies are 
reflected in figure 2 by the inverted ‘humps’ in the curves relating Z to 
λ. The same tendencies can be observed in relation to (7), the discount-
rate restriction (depicted in figure 3). As λ is increased from zero, the 
maximum discount rate consistent with correction of the hiring error 
initially falls but then rises again. 
This result accords with intuition. In jobs where learning is slow, 
incumbents might only achieve small reductions in unit labour costs 
before hiring errors were recognised, limiting the extent of a type 2 
worker’s handicap. Additionally, a further hiring error would only 
have limited cost because a type 1 worker without experience could 
perform almost as well as the incumbent. Conversely, when learning in 
a job is fast, a new worker could close any initial cost disadvantage 
quickly. For learning speeds in the intermediate range, however, gaps 
that emerge between the unit labour costs of incumbents and new 
workers are more likely to remain for extended periods. In such 
instances, it would be possible for incumbents continually to reduce 
costs over the employer’s entire time horizon, making it harder for a 
new type 2 worker to bridge the gap. 
This connection between the rate of learning and the profitability 
of reversing past hiring errors may indicate one possible competitive 
impetus towards deskilling in the design of jobs within capitalist firms 
(Marx, 1867; Botwinick, 1993, pp. 221-222). Rapid learning will take 
place in jobs that entail easily mastered tasks; slow learning will occur 
in jobs that involve only gradual and slight improvements in worker 
performance over time (in extreme cases, almost no learning over the 
employer’s time horizon). In either type of employment, on-the-job 
learning by workers will tend to play little role in capitalist firms’ drive 
to ever improving cost efficiency. One consequence of this is to make 
workers easier to replace or, essentially, more expendable. Such 
expendability is likely to appeal to capitalist employers for a variety of 
reasons. For one thing, the prerogative of workers to quit under a 
system of free labour exchange means that employers will need to find 
replacements from time to time. The more seamlessly new workers can 
be inserted into the production process, the less firms will experience 
temporary spikes in labour costs associated with staff turnover. Worker 
expendability may also serve capitalist employers’ interests as a labour 
discipline device, especially in periods of high unemployment, but also 
whenever there is an excess supply of workers for the particular jobs 
they happen to offer. By contrast, in jobs where worker learning occurs 
extensively and more or less continuously, replacing a worker can be 
more costly as well as potentially give workers more control over the 
work process and greater bargaining power over pay and conditions.15 
 
5. Implications and Limitations of the Model 
 
It may be worth briefly dwelling on the implications of the present 
model for individual workers. Whenever hiring errors occur, some 
workers are advantaged and others disadvantaged for reasons that are 
unrelated to their respective merits. In those instances where employers 
subsequently find it unprofitable to correct such errors, the advantages 
enjoyed, and disadvantages suffered, by individual workers will 
persist. 
The instinctive reaction of some may be to suppose that such 
persistence is due to the treatment of wages in the model, which are 
simply taken as given, and attribute the effects to wage ‘stickiness’ or 
market ‘imperfections’. However, allowing workers to undercut the 
                                                 
15 A recent example of deskilling may be found in information technology, where 
considerable energy has gone into standardisation and the facilitation of the re-
usability of previously written code (through an emphasis on object-oriented 
programming). One effect of these trends is to reduce the personal creative input of 
the individual worker, which is an element in making workers easier to replace. 
(Another example of deskilling might spring to an academic’s mind: the trend in 
university teaching towards the use of homogenised textbooks, complete with pre-
packaged lecture materials.) 
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wages of incumbents would not do anything to alter the basic results. It 
is true that by lowering the wages they are willing to accept, 
disadvantaged workers’ learning curves could be shifted down just far 
enough to make replacement of incumbents profitable for employers 
(provided incumbents do not respond by accepting lower wages 
themselves). But, in doing so, the effects of initial hiring errors would 
merely change form. Rather than disadvantaged workers being forced 
to accept alternative, inferior employment, or possibly remain 
unemployed, they would be obliged to accept a lower wage than would 
have been necessary had the hiring error never occurred. From a purely 
formal perspective, winning the position at a lower wage is 
indistinguishable from finding a similar, lower paid job elsewhere. 
Either way, the hiring error has a persistent effect on individual 
earnings. 
Although the foregoing analysis demonstrates the potential for 
such persistence in the effects of hiring errors, the gravity of this for 
individual workers is not an issue that can be addressed within the 
present model. The significance of a single instance of the job-
competition process to individual workers will depend on the extent to 
which the particular job at stake is superior to their next best 
alternatives. If missing out on the job is the difference between 
employment and unemployment, a full-time or part-time position, or a 
permanent or casual one, the consequences will be more serious than if 
the next best alternative is of broadly comparable appeal. Since at the 
aggregate level there is typically unemployment and 
underemployment, and since workers can queue for new jobs while 
currently employed, the number of workers queuing for each job, or 
each category of job, will normally be greater than the number of 
available positions. In such a context, it is clear that workers who miss 
out on a particular position may be forced to look elsewhere for less 
desirable employment. However, the actual degree to which workers’ 
alternative sources of employment are inferior will depend on the 
distribution of job opportunities on the one hand, and workers’ 
positions in the labour queue on the other. Workers’ positions in the 
labour queue will determine those parts of the distribution of job 
opportunities that are relevant to them. 
An examination of the many factors that influence the 
distribution of job opportunities and a worker’s position in the labour 
queue would need to go beyond the scope of the present analysis. But, 
in fact, much work (both competing and complementary) has already 
been carried out on these questions, for example by institutionalist 
theorists adopting the internal labour market approach (notably 
Doeringer and Piore, 1971), new institutionalists (e.g. Williamson, 
Wachter and Harris, 1975), those working in the segmented labour 
market tradition (following Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1982), and 
more recently, by classical Marxian economists conceiving both job 
formation and differential employment access within and between 
segments of the workforce as driven by the reproduction requirements 
of capital (exemplified by Mason, 1993, 1995; Botwinick, 1993). What 
perhaps has been less spelt out (though never far from the surface) is 
what these theories – as well as Thurow’s job-competition framework 
itself – suggest about the likely consequences of hiring decisions that 
fail to reward merit, from the perspective of the individual worker. 
This question has been the principal concern of the present analysis. 
It perhaps needs to be stressed that although the model has been 
discussed exclusively in terms of random error, the same factors that 
operate to lock in initial advantages or disadvantages arising from 
sheer luck will be equally operational when the initial hiring decision 
is not a random error, but instead one instance of a systematic trend 
towards the unequal treatment of members of a particular segment of 
the community. The way in which such differential access to 
employment emerges under capitalist conditions has been explored by 
the classical Marxian theorists cited above. Clearly, when members of 
some segments of the community have less access to job opportunities 
than members of other segments, discriminatory hiring practices will 
continually generate and reinforce earnings differentials between the 
segments that have nothing to do with merit. In relation to 
discriminatory hiring practices, the present analysis can be viewed in 
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two ways. It can be regarded as shedding light on the persistence of the 
effects of hiring errors when these involve members of the same 
segment of the community. While competitive pressures might 
promote meritocratic hiring within segments on the average, the model 
highlights that this does not prevent the persistence of unmeritocratic 
outcomes in individual instances. The analysis can also be viewed as 
providing additional insights into how capitalist social processes can 
reinforce the effects of discriminatory treatment between members of 
different segments. These insights are distinct, yet complementary, to 
explanations advanced in earlier work.16 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of the foregoing analysis has been to address the notion, 
implicit in some arguments used to defend prevailing inequalities, that 
the distribution of earned income accurately reflects the relative merits 
and free choices of individual workers. The desire to focus on this 
issue has not sprung from any belief in the supposed desirability of 
‘meritocracy’. The motive, rather, has been to challenge the perhaps 
common presumption that those down the lower end of the income 
scale must be there either through preference or because of a lack of 
skill, intelligence, effort, perseverance or some other element of so-
called merit, this presumption at least partly informed by a view that 
capitalist competition could not possibly produce anything other than a 
merit-based distribution. Luck, from such a standpoint, as well as 
                                                 
16 Mason identifies among classical Marxians “substantial agreement around the 
notion that alternative forms of discrimination are partly endogenous to material 
incentives emanating from the competitive process” (Mason, 1993, p. 4, emphasis 
added). Likewise, in the present analysis, the perspective has been one of viewing 
capitalist conditions (the free labour exchange, the profit motive, capitalist 
competition) as often conducive, not counter, to the perpetuation of unmeritocratic 
outcomes, even when these arise randomly. 
prejudice and discrimination, would seem to have no significant role to 
play in the determination of individual workers’ earnings. 
This impression of capitalist competition and the way in which it 
is actually likely to influence employment outcomes does not appear to 
be well founded. Within the model that has been presented, it is not 
always in the interests of employers to correct previous hiring errors. 
This result has been obtained without introducing any deviations from 
profit-maximising behaviour: firms have been taken always to base 
decisions strictly on the criterion of cost. Nor does the result derive 
from any reference to ‘rigidities’, ‘impediments’ or ‘obstacles’ to the 
competitive process: hiring and firing have been assumed to be 
completely free of cost and instantaneous in execution. Indeed, within 
the model, it is because of the free labour exchange and profit motive 
that initial instances of good or bad luck have been found to persist. 
Or, to put it another way, it is precisely key features of the system that 
bring about the results of the model. 
It may appear paradoxical, but if ‘merit’ is the criterion upon which 
society wishes recruitment decisions to be based, something other than 
the profit motive will sometimes be needed to drive decisions. Or, 
conversely, since under capitalism the profit motive is the driving 
force, meritocracy can fall victim to the imperatives of capital. It is 
tempting to suggest, in such instances, that meritocracy is made 
‘impossible’ by the very thing often claimed to make it inevitable. 
 
Appendix 
 
The complete model, couched in slightly more general terms, starts 
with the following learning curve: 
 ( )i i i iu m c tθ= +  (1A) 
where the function ( )i tθ captures the learning process and is defined 
such that (0) 1iθ =  and ( ) 0i tθ →  as t → ∞ . Taken together, these 
features ensure that ( )i iu t m→  as t → ∞ . By assumption, ( )i tθ  is 
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continuous and twice differentiable. The presence of learning dictates 
that ( ) 0i tθ ′ < , but there is no compulsion to restrict the sign of ( )i tθ ′′  
over the entire domain of the learning curve unless this is considered 
desirable in a specific context. 
If a type 1 worker receives a headstart of length τ, the total 
discounted period cost of retaining the incumbent for the duration of 
the employer’s time horizon is now: 
 
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
1
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
h h h
I rt rt rt
h
r rh rh rt
C m c t e dt m e dt c t e dt
c
e m e c h e t e dt
r r
τ τ τ
τ τ τ
τ
τ
τ
θ θ
θ τ θ τ θ
+ + +
− − −
+
− − − −
= + = +
′= − + − + +
∫ ∫ ∫
∫
 
The corresponding costs for type 1 and 2 workers without experience 
are: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] 11 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1 ( ) ( )
h
N rh rh rt
c
C m e c h e t e dt
r r
θ θ− − −′= − + − + ∫  
 ( ) ( )[ ] 22 2 2 2 2
0
1
1 1 ( ) ( )
h
N rh rh rt
c
C m e c h e t e dt
r r
θ θ− − −′= − + − + ∫  
Setting Z = 0 and rearranging gives: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) 0
h
r r h rt
h
rh rt
h
rh rt
e m c e m c h c t e dt
p m c e m c h c t e dt
p m c e m c h c t e dt
τ
τ τ
τ
θ τ θ τ θ
θ θ
θ θ
+
− − + −
− −
− −
′+ − + + +
′− + − + +
′− − + − + + =
   
   
∫
∫
∫
(2A) 
By the implicit function theorem, h can once again be expressed as a 
function of the various parameters. 
The necessary condition, 0F h∂ ∂ > , can be checked by 
differentiating (2A) with respect to h. Upon rearrangement: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )[ ]1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) 1 ( )rh rF e m c h e p m c h p m c h
h
τθ τ θ θ− −∂ = + + − + + − +∂
 
Rewriting this expression in terms of instantaneous unit labour costs 
makes it clear that we have arrived at the same expression for F h∂ ∂  as 
was derived in the specific model: 
 ( )( )1 1 2( ) ( ) 1 ( )rh rF e u h e pu h p u hh
ττ− −∂ = + − + −∂     
Accordingly, (6) remains the relevant necessary condition and (7) 
continues to hold as the appropriate restriction on the employer’s 
discount rate. 
By restricting r to values below the critical rate, so that 0F h∂ ∂ > , 
the signs of the various partial derivatives can be evaluated: 
 
( )1 ( ) 1 0r rhu e ef
F h
τ
τ
τ − − −= − >∂ ∂  
 2 1 0
N N
p
C C
f
F h
−= − >∂ ∂  
 ( )( )
2
1 1
0
rh
m
p e
f
F h
−− −= − >∂ ∂  
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( ) ( )
2
2 2
0
1 ( ) 1 ( )
0
h
rh rt
c
p h e t e dt
f
F h
θ θ− −′− − −
= − >∂ ∂
   ∫  
Note that in 
2cf  the sign of the term in large brackets is negative 
because 0 1θ< <  and 0 1rhe−< < . 
 ( )( )
1
1
0
rh r
m
e e p
f
F h
τ− −− −= − <∂ ∂  provided 
rp e τ−<  
 
( )
1
1 1 1 1 1
0
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
0
h h
r r h rt rh rt
c
e h e t e dt p h e t e dt
f
F h
τ
τ τ
τ
θ τ θ τ θ θ θ
+
− − + − − −′ ′− + + − − +
= − <∂ ∂
         ∫ ∫
 
 provided 
( )1 1 1
1 1
0
( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( )
h
r rh rt
h
rh rt
e h e t e dt
p
h e t e dt
τ
τ
τ
θ τ θ τ θ
θ θ
+
− − −
− −
′− + +
<
′− +
∫
∫
 
As was found in the specific version of the model, larger values for c1 
and m1 only make replacement of the incumbent more likely if the 
probability of hiring error is not too high. Like before, the tightness of 
the restriction on p depends on r and τ. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Case 1. c2 < c1, λ2 < λ1, m2+ c2 < m1+ c1. 
 
 
Case 2. c2 > c1, λ2 > λ1, m2+ c2 < m1+ c1. 
 
 
 
 
Case 3. c2 > c1, λ2 > λ1, m2+ c2 > m1+ c1. 
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Figure 2 
 
Example 1: m1 = 100, m2 = 75, c1 = 200, c2 = 150, τ = h = 1, v = 1.33, r = 0.05 
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Example 2: m1 = 100, m2 = 85, c1 = 200, c2 = 170, τ = 1, h = 10, v = 1.176, r = 0.05 
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Figure 3 
 
Example 1: m1 = 100, m2 = 75, c1 = 200, c2 = 150, τ = h = 1, v = 1.33 
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Example 2: m1 = 100, m2 = 85, c1 = 200, c2 = 170, τ = 2, h = 7, v = 1.176 
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